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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal by Joseph Fiorelli from a final judgment 
of conviction and sentence following a criminal jury trial in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. We will vacate Fiorelli's sentence and remand 
for resentencing. 
 
I. 
 
From 1967 to 1991, Fiorelli was employed as the 
business representative of Drywall Finishers Local Union 
1955 of the International Brotherhood of Painters and 
Allied Trades. Fiorelli also served as a trustee for the Local 
1955 Health and Welfare Fund and several other union 
benefit funds. As business representative, Fiorelli was 
responsible for overseeing the daily operation of the union, 
whose members were employed by contractors and 
construction companies engaged in drywall finishing. The 
job of a drywall finisher is to complete the installation of 
drywall in a residential or commercial building using tape 
and joint compound. 
 
A federal grand jury returned a 15-count indictment 
against Fiorelli, charging him with demanding and 
accepting illegal payments and gifts from contractors 
during his service as business representative. After trial, a 
petit jury found Fiorelli guilty of most of the counts in the 
indictment, including racketeering, conspiracy to violate the 
Taft-Hartley Act, unlawful request and receipt of money by 
a union official, extortion, embezzlement, and obstruction of 
justice. The jury also ordered forfeiture of $68,984 in 
racketeering proceeds. The district court sentenced Fiorelli 
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to 121 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of 
supervised release, a fine of $12,500, and special 
assessments totaling $600. This appeal followed. 
 
The government's case at trial consisted of a parade of 
builders and contractors who testified that they made 
periodic payments to Fiorelli or to James Siesser, his 
associate, on Fiorelli's behalf. These payments were made, 
for the most part, because the witnesses believed it was in 
their economic interest to do so. Some said they wanted to 
assure themselves of a good supply of qualified union 
workers or to avoid trouble over their having used non- 
union workers. Others paid because they believed the 
payments would guarantee labor peace and acceptable 
contracts. These witnesses did not report express threats of 
violence or economic harm but indicated that, based on 
their contact with Fiorelli and Siesser, they feared labor 
trouble if they did not pay. 
 
One witness, William Sampsel, testified that, upon 
arriving in Philadelphia to oversee his firm's execution of a 
contract to do the drywall work in a 19-story building, 
Fiorelli demanded $38,000 in return for assuring that he 
would have a supply of good workers. Siesser visited the job 
site a number of times to pressure Sampsel and ultimately 
threatened him with bodily harm if he reported Fiorelli's 
demands to the FBI. The government did not contend that 
Fiorelli ever obtained money or anything else of value from 
Sampsel. 
 
Fiorelli testified in his own behalf. He admitted that he 
received payments that he regarded as Christmas gifts and 
vacation money from contractors and builders who thought 
well of him and wanted to give him what he called "tips." 
He insisted, however, that he had never threatened violence 
or economic harm to any of the builder/contractor 
witnesses. He also specifically denied ever asking Sampsel 
for money. 
 
The record affirmatively reflects that the district court 
considered Fiorelli's written objections to the presentence 
report and that it afforded counsel ample opportunity at 
two sentencing hearings to address those objections and 
any other he wished to make. Ultimately, the court, with 
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one exception not here relevant, adopted the factual 
findings and guideline application set forth in that report. 
In accordance with the adopted guideline application, the 
court grouped the offenses in ten groups. Each extortion 
offense against a particular victim was placed in a separate 
group. The obstruction of justice offense, which related to 
an effort by Fiorelli to cover up his embezzlement of union 
funds to pay personal dental expenses, was not placed in a 
separate group but served as the basis for an enhancement 
of the offense level for the underlying embezzlement. After 
applying the multiple-count adjustment of U.S.S.G. 
S 3D1.4, the court determined that 27, the base offense 
level for group seven, was the "greater adjusted offense 
level." Adding five levels under U.S.S.G. S 3D1.4, reflecting 
the groups of offenses, the district court concluded that the 
combined adjusted offense level was 32 and that the 
guideline range for imprisonment is 121 months to 151 
months. 
 
Fiorelli, in addition to challenging the presentence report 
in a number of respects, moved for a downward departure 
based on extraordinary family circumstances. This motion 
was premised on the fact that Fiorelli played an important 
role in the life of his granddaughter who suffers from 
cerebral palsy. The district court heard extensive evidence 
in support of this motion, but ultimately exercised its 
discretion to deny it. 
 
II. 
 
Since it is clear that the district court recognized that it 
had discretion to depart downward on the basis of 
extraordinary circumstances, we have no jurisdiction to 
review its decision not to depart. See United States v. 
Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1989). Accordingly, we 
turn to Fiorelli's challenges to the district court's 
calculation of the guideline range. All, save one, of those 
challenges present no substantial issue. 
 
First, Fiorelli contests the district court's failure to group 
the extortion offenses. He insists that they must be grouped 
together because they were all alleged in the RICO count to 
be part of a pattern of racketeering activity. U.S.S.G. 
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S 3D1.2 provides the governing rules regarding grouping, 
however, and where the offenses involved are extortion 
offenses, there are different victims, and no count involves 
conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic 
in, or adjunct to, the guideline for another count, S 3D1.2 
does not authorize grouping. The fact that the extortions 
are a part of a pattern of racketeering activity is simply 
irrelevant to the grouping issue under these circumstances. 
 
Turning to the crucial calculation of the offense level for 
group seven, Fiorelli asserts that the district court made no 
findings to support its specific offense characteristic 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. S 2B3.2(b)(1) for threatening 
bodily injury, its role in the offense adjustment under 
U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(c) for being an organizer and supervisor, 
or its role in the offense adjustment for abusing a position 
of trust under U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3. This is simply not the case. 
The district court adopted express findings (1) that 
"Sampsel threatened to go to the FBI and Siesser, under 
Fiorelli's direction, threatened bodily injury and death if 
Sampsel went to the FBI" (PSR at 24); (2) that "Fiorelli 
recruited and supervised James Siesser" (PSR at 25); and 
(3) that "Fiorelli was the business manager of Local 1955 
and in that position he was afforded substantial judgment 
that is ordinarily given considerable deference . . . and [he] 
used this position to coerce and extort money from 
contractors" (PSR at 25). None of these findings is clearly 
erroneous. Moreover, Fiorelli is also in error in arguing that 
"abuse of trust is an element inherent in the offense 
extortion" so that an adjustment for such abuse would 
somehow amount to double counting. 
 
III. 
 
A more serious issue is presented by the district court's 
two level adjustment of the offense level of group seven for 
an obstruction of justice through perjured testimony at 
trial. 
 
A. The Controlling Law 
 
An adjustment is authorized by U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 "[i]f the 
defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to 
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obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the 
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant 
offense." Perjurious testimony by a defendant at trial can 
clearly constitute such an obstruction of justice. 
Application Note 3(b); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 
87 (1993). 
 
At the time of Fiorelli's crime and at the time of his 
sentencing, Application Note 1 to S 3C1.1 read, in relevant 
part, as follows:1 
 
       This provision is not intended to punish a defendant 
       for the exercise of a constitutional right. A defendant's 
       denial of guilt (other than a denial of guilt under oath 
       that constitutes perjury) . . . is not a basis for 
       application of this provision. In applying this provision 
       in respect to alleged false testimony or statements by 
       the defendant, such testimony or statements should be 
       evaluated in a light most favorable to the defendant. 
 
The Supreme Court and this court have provided a gloss 
on S 3C1.1 that is helpful here. We begin with United States 
v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993). The Court there held that 
"the Constitution permits a court to enhance a defendant's 
sentence under [S 3C1.1] if the court finds the defendant 
committed perjury at trial." Id. at 88-89. Because fear of an 
unjustified enhancement may chill exercise of the 
defendant's constitutional right to testify in his own 
defense, however, there was an important caveat to this 
holding: "the trial court must make findings to support all 
the elements of a perjury violation in the specific case," id. 
at 97, that is, factual findings that the defendant (1) gave 
false testimony (2) concerning a material matter (3) with the 
willful intent to provide false testimony. Id. at 94. 
 
We first had occasion to apply the teachings of Dunnigan 
in United States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470 (3d Cir. 1996). We 
there held that "express separate findings are not required" 
under Dunnigan. Id. at 479. We explained that where "the 
record establishes that the district court's application of the 
enhancement necessarily included a finding as to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This segment of Application Note 1 was amended, effective November 
1, 1997. See footnote 3, infra. 
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elements of perjury, and those findings are supported by 
the record, we will not remand merely because the district 
court failed to engage in a ritualistic exercise and state the 
obvious for the record." Id. 
 
Boggi, like Fiorelli, was a union official who had been 
found guilty of extorting money and services from 
contractors. When reviewing the perjury enhancement 
imposed by the district court under S 3C1.1, we stressed 
that the record reflected that Boggi took the stand in his 
own defense and specifically denied receiving anything of 
value from each of the contractors named in the 
indictment. Id. at 478-79.2 The district court, at sentencing, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The colloquy we cited in support of this proposition as follows: 
 
Q. Okay, Mr. Boggi, you've been charged with accepting money from 
Mr. and Mrs. Magac. Did you ever accept any money from Mr. and Mrs. 
Magac? 
 
A. No, I did not. 
 
Q. You've been charged with accepting money from Mr. Meister or 
Philmont Contractors. Did you ever accept any money from him or them 
or it? 
 
A. No, I did not. 
 
Q. You've been charged with accepting money from Samuel Kaufman, 
Inc. Did you ever accept any money from Mr. Kaufman or his 
corporation? 
 
A. No, I did not. 
 
Q. You've been charged with accepting money from Stuart Gray or 
Denver Drywall Company, Inc. Did you ever accept any money from it or 
him? 
 
A. No, I did not. 
 
Q. You've been charged with accepting kitchen cabinets from 
Calvanese Corporation, CGC Corporation -- CJC Corporation, excuse 
me, or Carmen Calvanese. Did you ever accept as a gift any kitchen 
cabinets from Mr. Calvanese, from Calvanese Corporation or from CJC 
Construction Company? 
 
A. No, sir. 
 
Q. You've been charged with accepting a gift of two tickets to the 
Super Bowl from 1990 from Mr. Wyatt. Did you receive the two ticket -- 
two Super Bowl tickets from Mr. Wyatt? 
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recognized that " `a guilty verdict . . . binds the sentencing 
court to accept the facts necessarily implicit in the 
verdict.' " Id. at 478-79 (quoting United States v. Weston, 
960 F.2d 212, 218 (1st Cir. 1992)). It understandably 
concluded: "I don't see how, in view of his flat denials and 
the jury's conviction, that you can find otherwise than that 
he testified falsely on the stand." Id. at 478. Given that 
receipt of something of value was an essential element of 
the charges against Boggi, his testimony on this issue "was 
necessarily material" as a matter of law. Id. at 479. 
Moreover, given his specific and unambiguous "flat denials" 
concerning an issue that was the central focus of the trial, 
the record provided ample assurance "that Boggi provided 
false testimony with willful intent, `rather than as a result 
of confusion, mistaken or faulty memory.' " Id. at 479 
(quoting Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94). Thus, while there were 
no express findings of the district court in Boggi on 
materiality and willfulness, "the record establishe[d] that 
[its] application of the enhancement necessarily included a 
finding as to the elements of perjury." Id.  
 
In United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37 (3d Cir. 1997), we 
turned our attention to Application Note 1 to S 3C1.1. 
There, the district court had made a finding that specific 
testimony of the defendant going to a critical issue at his 
trial had been willfully false. The defendant insisted on 
appeal, however, that S 3C1.1 and Application Note 1 
required the government to prove each of the elements of 
perjury by "a higher standard than a preponderance of the 
evidence." Id. at 44. We agreed and found it necessary to 
remand for resentencing because there was "no indication 
in the record that the district judge . . . placed the burden 
of proof upon the government and viewed the evidence in 
the light most favorable to Arnold." Id. We instructed that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
A. Yes, I did. 
 
Q. Mr. Boggi, did you ever accept any money from any contractor 
with whom you had dealings as a union representative? 
 
A. No, I did not. 
 
Boggi, App. at 1118-19. 
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"[o]n remand, the district court must use the clear and 
convincing standard, place the burden of proof upon the 
government, and support its decision with the findings 
required by the Supreme Court's decision in Dunnigan." Id.3 
 
Since Arnold, we added further to our gloss on S 3C1.1 in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Application Note 1 was amended, effective November 1, 1997, to 
substitute the following for the concluding sentence quoted above in the 
text: 
 
       In applying this provision in respect to alleged false testimony or 
       statements by the defendant, the court should be cognizant that 
       inaccurate testimony or statements sometimes may result from 
       confusion, mistake, or faulty memory and, thus, not all inaccurate 
       testimony or statements necessarily reflect a willful attempt to 
       obstruct justice. 
 
The Sentencing Commission adopted this change so that the 
Application Note "no longer suggests the use of a heightened standard of 
proof. Instead, it clarifies that the court should be mindful that not all 
inaccurate testimony or statements reflect a willful attempt to obstruct 
justice." U.S.S.G. Appendix C, Amendment 566 (1997). 
 
Although the eliminated sentence can accurately be described as 
ambiguous with respect to whether a clear and convincing standard is 
required and although the Commission's explanation for its amendment 
uses the word "clarifies," this is not a situation in which the Commission 
has amended an application note to resolve an ambiguity by explaining 
what the intent behind the ambiguous provision was. The Commission's 
explanation acknowledges that the concluding sentence of the prior 
version, which originated in 1990, suggested a standard higher than a 
preponderance of the evidence and indicates that it was stricken to 
eliminate that suggestion for the future. Moreover, it is clear from a 
comparison of the texts of the new sentence and the stricken one that 
the new sentence was not intended to set forth the intended meaning of 
the stricken one. Rather, the new sentence is intended to clarify the 
intended application of the guideline and the application notes by calling 
attention to the 1993 teachings of the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993). Accordingly, this is not a situation in 
which we, as a panel, are free to reexamine our decision in United States 
v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37 (3d Cir. 1997), in light of the subsequent 
amendment to Application Note 1. Cf. United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 
844 (3d Cir. 1992). The 1990 version of Application Note 1 is applicable 
here, and we are bound by its interpretation in Arnold. See United States 
v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 
550 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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United States v. McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1997). 
McLaughlin was convicted of income tax evasion. At trial, 
he testified that a particular bank account was a reserve 
against future warranty claims and that its balance 
therefore was being treated as accrued income over a ten 
year period. As a result, McLaughlin contended that there 
was no tax loss attributable to the income deposited in that 
account. 
 
At the sentencing hearing in McLaughlin, the district 
court imposed a S 3C1.1 enhancement. It concluded in 
conclusory fashion that McLaughlin was guilty of "a willful 
impediment to obstruction of justice." Id. at 139. It then 
gave the following, sole example: 
 
       For example, . . . Mark McLaughlin testified . . . that, 
       in order to add additional money to "the reserve," "we 
       formed a bank account in South Jersey into which we 
       deposited cash into that account." The defense 
       concedes that the jury convicted the Defendants of 
       failing to report this income . . . . 
 
Id. 
 
We held that the enhancement was "clear error." Id. at 
140. We first noted that the jury had "returned a general 
verdict of guilty that [did] not distinguish between the 
[various] accounts." Id. at 138. It thus did "not disclose 
whether the jury rejected all or only part of Mark's 
testimony." Id. at 140 n.11. Accordingly, the falsity of 
McLaughlin's testimony regarding the First Fidelity account 
was not necessarily implicit in the verdict. 
 
We went on to point out that even if the falsity of this 
testimony had been necessarily inherent in the jury's 
verdict, "the jury's having disbelieved him" would not "alone 
. . . support a finding that Mark testified `with the willful 
intent to provide false testimony.' " Id. at 140 (emphasis 
supplied). The record did not contain evidence from which 
a conclusion of willfulness was unavoidable and the district 
court provided no explanation as to whether or why it had 
become clearly convinced that the referenced testimony was 
willfully false. Accordingly, we held that the district court 
had "failed to hold the government to [the clear and 
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convincing] burden of proof" standard required by Arnold. 
Id. 
 
In the course of making the point that a jury finding of 
falsity does not necessarily mean there has been perjury, 
we quoted from our pre-Dunnigan decision in United States 
v. Colletti, 984 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1992). We italicized the 
portion of the quoted sentence which supported that point. 
Another portion of that sentence repeated dicta from Colletti 
to the effect that the government must prove not only 
perjury to support a S 3C1.1 adjustment but also that the 
perjury was so "far-reaching as to impose some incremental 
burdens upon the government." 126 F.3d at 140. Fiorelli 
points to this portion of McLaughlin in support of his 
argument that the government's case here was deficient. 
We decline to recognize this requirement as part of the law 
of our circuit. 
 
The quotation in McLaughlin regarding the necessity of an 
"incremental burden" was dicta in that case as well as in 
Colletti. Our confidence that it was not advanced by the 
McLaughlin court as a basis for the conclusion reached 
comes not only from the text of the opinion but also from 
the fact that such a holding would have been clearly 
inconsistent with the application notes and the decision of 
the Supreme Court in Dunnigan. At the time McLaughlin 
was decided, and at the time of Fiorelli's sentencing, as is 
true today, Application Note 3(b) expressly stated that 
"committing . . . perjury" was "conduct to which this 
enhancement applies." The Supreme Court took note of this 
fact in Dunnigan. It then went on to observe: 
 
        Were we to have the question before us without 
       reference to this commentary, we would have to 
       acknowledge that some of our precedents do not 
       interpret perjury to constitute an obstruction of justice 
       unless the perjury is part of some greater design to 
       interfere with judicial proceedings. 
 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 93. The Supreme Court concluded, 
however, that a construction of S 3C1.1 that would require 
more than proof of the existence of perjury would be 
"inconsistent with its accompanying commentary." Id. at 94.4 
Thus, even if our statement in Colletti had not been dicta, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note, as well, that in sharp contrast to Application Note 3(b), 
Application Note 3(g) requires that a materially false statement to a law 
enforcement officer must significantly obstruct or impede the official 
investigation before a S 3C1.1 enhancement is appropriate. 
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its vitality would not have survived Dunnigan. 
 
B. Application 
 
Application of these governing principles to the record in 
this case involves a close judgment call. The only relevant 
comments of the district court are cryptic. At the same 
time, however, the record bears strong evidence that would 
support a finding of perjury in connection with the offenses 
in group seven. Ultimately, we conclude that this case is 
more like McLaughlin than Boggi, and out of an abundance 
of caution, decide to remand to provide an opportunity for 
the district court to make its views clear. 
 
Fiorelli's Presentence Report, in explaining its 
recommended S 3C1.1 enhancement to the group seven 
offense level, states that "Fiorelli obstructed justice by 
perjuring himself repeatedly on the stand." PSR at 25. In 
response to Fiorelli's objection, the presentence officer 
added, "Defense counsel admitted that Fiorelli denied 
extorting money or services and that the jury did not accept 
Fiorelli's denial. This constitutes perjury under United 
States v. Dunnigan." PSR Addendum at 2. These statements 
of the probation officer were directed not only to group 
seven but to each group of offenses that included an 
extortion charge. In addition to adopting the presentence 
report, the district court quoted this response to Fiorelli's 
objection at the sentencing hearing and indicated that it 
was "persuaded by the statement of the Probation Officer." 
It then overruled the objection. There are no other relevant 
findings in the record. 
 
Two racketeering acts of Fiorelli have been grouped in 
group seven. The jury found that the government had 
proved both beyond a reasonable doubt. The first was to 
demand $38,000 from William Sampsel and his firm, Alpha 
Painting and Restorations, Inc., while serving as a 
representative of one or more of its employees in violation 
of 29 U.S.C. S 186. The second of these racketeering 
activities was attempting to obtain $38,000 from Alpha "by 
wrongful use of . . . threatened force, violence and fear, 
including fear of economic harm" in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1951. As we have earlier noted, Fiorelli took the stand 
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and specifically denied ever asking William Sampsel for 
money. The fact that he did so ask is necessarily inherent 
in the jury's verdict on both of these racketeering acts. 
Accordingly, if there were some record indication that the 
district court relied on Fiorelli's testimony that he had 
never asked Sampsel for money, this case would be 
indistinguishable from Boggi. Since a finding that this 
testimony was false was implicit in the verdict, that verdict 
would establish that falsity had been proven by more than 
clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, as in Boggi, the 
conclusion would be inescapable in the context of the 
charges being defended against and the unambiguity of 
Fiorelli's denial that this falsehood was deliberate, rather 
than the result of confusion, mistake, or lapse of memory. 
Finally, as in Boggi, the jury's verdict and the record would 
permit us to say with confidence that the government 
carried its heavy burden in proving all of the elements of 
perjury.5 
 
The difficulty from the government's point of view arises 
from the fact that neither the presentence report nor the 
district court at the sentencing hearing focused on Fiorelli's 
denial of a request of money from Sampsel or, indeed, on 
the particular allegations, testimony, or verdict with respect 
to the group seven offenses. To the extent there was any 
focus on the perjury issue, it was not on Fiorelli's having 
denied requesting money from Sampsel, but rather on his 
having denied obtaining money and services from others by 
extortionate means. This fact changes our analysis because, 
as we have noted, Fiorelli freely acknowledged receiving 
money and services from contractors and builders other 
than Sampsel. He denied only making threats or promises 
in connection with his receiving those funds and services. 
Moreover, as we have also noted, the testimony of the 
builder/contractors was not that Fiorelli made explicit 
threats but rather that they interpreted his conduct to 
imply that there was cause for fear if they did not pay.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Judge Rosenn believes this case is indistinguishable from Boggi. He 
would therefore affirm the judgment of conviction and the sentence as is. 
 
6. While Sampsel testified to an express threat of bodily injury, that 
threat was in connection with a demand by Siesser that Sampsel not go 
to the FBI, rather than in connection with the demand for $38,000. 
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The operative portions of the extortion allegations of the 
indictment are that the specified payments were made "with 
the consent of the contractors having been induced by the 
wrongful use of . . . fear, including fear of economic harm." 
See Gov't App. at 14. In a labor racketeering case involving 
similar allegations and a denial by the defendant that any 
threats were made, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit upheld the conviction, ruling as follows: 
 
       The fear need not be the consequence of a direct or 
       implicit threat by the defendant, and the government's 
       burden of proof is satisfied if it shows that the victim 
       feared an economic harm, and that the circumstances 
       surrounding the alleged extortionate conduct rendered 
       that fear reasonable. . . . 
 
       [S]o long as the defendant intends to exploit the 
       reasonable fear of the victim, his actions will constitute 
       extortion under the Hobbs Act. 
 
United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 330-31 (4th Cir. 
1982) (citations omitted).7 
 
Given the concerns reflected in Dunnigan's requirement 
of findings, if a sentencing court is going to rely on the 
verdict of the jury as laying part of the foundation for a 
S 3C1.1 enhancement, there should be no question but that 
the relevant finding was necessarily made by the jury. In 
this context, we are hesitant to conclude that the falsity of 
Fiorelli's testimony about the absence of any threats by him 
is necessarily inherent in the jury's verdict on the extortion 
charges. Moreover, we find inadequate other assurance in 
the record that the district court, in reaching its decision 
on the S 3C1.1 enhancement, held the government to its 
heavy burden of proving falsity and willfulness by clear and 
convincing evidence as required by Arnold. 
 
IV. 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand for resentencing only. On remand, the district court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See also United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1513 (6th Cir. 
1991) (collecting cases). 
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should determine whether the government met its burden 
of proving each of the elements of perjury as set forth above 
and should make appropriate specific findings to reflect its 
decision. We do not foreclose the district court from 
imposing a S 3C1.1 perjury enhancement provided it does 
so in a manner consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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